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Swedish Welfare and Development

Swedish Welfare and Development in
the Post-War Decades
Alexandru Zanca, University of Pennsylvania
Introduction
Scandinavian nations are conventionally perceived as
successful examples of welfare states, where capitalist market
institutions and extensive social policies happily go hand in
hand. Public fascination with the “Nordic model” began in
1936 when the American journalist Marquis Childs published
Sweden: The Middle Way, an appraisal of the reformist policies
being introduced by the Swedish Social Democratic Party
at this time.1 In reference to Sweden, Childs proclaims in
the introduction of his book: “it is true that the domestic
economy has been made to serve the greatest good of the
greatest number.”2 This was a bold claim to make during the
Great Depression about an economy of any kind. Turning
into a bestseller overnight, Sweden: The Middle Way caught
the attention of President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself.
He subsequently decided to send a commission to Europe,
including Scandinavia, to research cooperative systems there.3
One result was an admiration for Swedish policymaking that
persists among public officials to this day. For example, in an
interview at the Wharton School in April 2019, former Fed
Chairman Alan Greenspan suggested that the United States
look to Sweden for inspiration on how to solve the current
Social Security crisis.4
However endearing the Nordic socialist utopia might
look, liberal America’s fetishization of the Swedish model
tends to simplify or erase the intricate mechanics behind
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economic development in general, and Swedish development in
particular. For centuries now, social scientists have been trying
to understand and develop consistent theories on how nations
bring about economic prosperity. One particular aspect that
constitutes a “chicken or egg” dilemma is the directionality of
the welfare-development relationship. For instance, the British
economist John A. Hobson, in his study on imperialism, argues
that sustained economic growth requires increases in taxes and
wages;5 in other words, welfare promotes development. On
the other hand, Columbia University professor W. W. Rostow
proposes in his analysis of the stages of economic growth that
welfare succeeds development, representing just one of the
possible paths that nations may choose once they accumulate
economic surpluses.6
Given this divergence of views within the field of
development studies, this paper aims to further investigate the
nature of the welfare-development relationship and reconcile
opinions on the matter. First, this paper argues that economic
development and welfare are bidirectionally connected through
mutually-enforcing dynamics at labor and social policy levels.
Second, this paper proposes that, because the main factors
acting on it are the domestic administrative system and
international long-term trends, this relationship is delicate and
susceptible to breakdown under inconsistent policymaking
and inadequate political responses to crises. Sweden in the
post-war decades of 1945-1975 constitutes an appropriate case
study for supporting this two-fold thesis. As one of only two
nations in Europe (the other being Norway) to feature social
democratic hegemony, that is a near dominance of the political
left over the state, for an extended period of time, Sweden
presents a particular set of post-war policies that highlight
valuable aspects of the welfare-development relationship.7
In this regard, it is notable that during this period of general
economic expansion in Europe, also known as “the Golden
Age,” Sweden managed to maintain considerably high growth
Penn History Review
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rates8 alongside diminished economic inequalities,9 10 having
seemingly overcome the efficiency-equity trade-off within the
welfare-development relationship.
Historical Context
Towards the end of the 20th century, the labor
movement started to gain ground in Sweden, its main
branches being the Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sveriges
socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, SAP) and the Swedish
Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen i Sverige,
LO). In the context of increasing capitalist pressures and under
the influence of socialist ideas migrating from Germany, the
SAP formed in 1889 as an extension of regional trade unions
and socialist groups. The SAP served as the central party for the
movement, as well as the main trade union organization until
the creation of the LO in 1898.11 The labor movement found
favorable factors in Sweden, rising alongside the evangelical
and temperance movements as part of a series of popular
movements. With a population that was over 50% rural at
the time, Sweden saw popular movements easily form roots in
tight-knit, self-organized countryside communities.12
At the beginning of the 20th century, significant
systemic changes impacted Sweden. The nation with its modern
borders formed in 1905 after the dissolution of its union with
Norway.13 Additionally, in 1911, universal suffrage for men
was achieved, consequently increasing the SAP’s representation
in the Riksdag (the Swedish Parliament).14 As the nation
restructured, so did the SAP. In 1917, a small revolutionary
faction of the party separated and formed the Communist
Party. The SAP that remained after the split advanced with a
vision of peaceful reform and transition. Nationalization, a
key issue in the SAP’s program throughout the 1920s, became
increasingly marginalized and had been replaced by 1932 with
the concept of a planned economy that was less concerned with
40
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issues of proprietorship.15

The building of the Swedish Parliament in Stockholm, also known as the Riksdag

However, Marxist tendencies could not gain traction in
Sweden, which has a strong Protestant tradition based on values
of individual responsibility. Abandoning the SAP’s Marxist
ideologies left behind a void that the party leadership quickly
filled with ideas borrowed from German academic socialism,
the British Fabians and, most of all, Keynesian expansionism.
Thus, from the 1930s onwards, the SAP incorporated the
theory of leveling economic cycles (saving during expansions
to spend during recessions) and the theory of purchasing
power (stimulating the economy through robust wages to
sustain demand) into its fundamental crisis management
policy.16 In terms of class structure, interwar Sweden featured
a weak middle class, a well-organized industry and business
community, mostly represented through the Swedish Employers
Confederation (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen, SAF), and a
vast, uniform proletariat. According to class theory, this meant
there was a trade-off that the SAP had to face when seeking the
support of these groups. Given the SAP’s close ties with the
LO, the obvious choice for the party was to rely on strong class
politics directed at the working class, which ended up forming
most of the party’s electorate.17
The cumulation of trends and events in the early
20th century -- ideological shifts, expanded voting rights, the
Penn History Review
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popularity of labor movements within Sweden’s class structure
-- made it possible for the SAP to attain a dominant position
in the Riksdag and become identified with the larger national
interest. This culminated with the SAP gaining control of
the government in 1932, which it maintained uninterrupted
until 1976. During the World War II period, the SAP further
boosted its popularity by marching on a platform of neutrality.18
19

Policy-Making Framework
At the beginning of this remarkable stage in the SAP’s
and Sweden’s shared existence, both the nation (at least in
its geographical sense) and the party were young. In terms
of policymaking, this meant a lack of institutional memory
and reduced risk-aversion created an increased potential for
unconventional outcomes. Moreover, as the SAP began its long
reign in Sweden, the nation was already robustly industrialized.
Per capita income increased by 131% from 1870 to 1910 along
with the consolidation of an export-based technological sector
that included Nobel Industries, Atlas Copco, L. M. Ericson,
ASEA, Alfa-Laval, and SKF. In the inter-war period, the
consumer durables sector took off as well. Given this productive
prowess that Sweden had developed over the previous halfcentury, the 1930s world economic crisis proved to be gentle on
its economy.20 This favorable business cycle constituted a third
factor contributing to Sweden’s unconventional policymaking
outcomes.
Esping-Andersen notes that the Swedish welfare state
is peculiarly structured so that it reconciles efficiency with
equity. Although costly, the welfare system is mostly perceived
as an investment that will pay for itself later. The policymaking
philosophy is one of “productivistic” and preventive social
policy, which translates into minimal public support for
providing unemployment benefits but considerable spending
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Framework for unconventional policy outcomes

for education, healthcare, and labor mobility. Government
action is not meant to disincentivize employment but support
it, thus encouraging citizens to contribute productively to
society and become more deeply integrated within it. The party
developed a narrative around folkhemmet (“People’s home”),
the idea that the whole nation should feel like home for the
Swedish people.21 As a result, any government interventions
that the SAP designed had to subscribe to the principles of
assisted self-help -- the idea that welfare assistance does not clear
individuals of responsibilities but seeks to boost their abilities to
improve their situation--and universality -- the idea that welfare
does not carry any stigma but serves to foster social integration
and elevate individuals to full citizenship status. With such
guidelines, the nation and the party became paternalistic,
burdened by the mission of designing a Swedish identity on the
idealistic model of the “conscientious worker.”22
In order to secure and hold onto political power, the
SAP employed a strategy of accord initiatives and “open-door
politics.” This was not a strategy of compromise, but one of
gaining cross-class trust (for example, by not taking part in
revolutionary actions that would alarm the upper classes)
and then working with others towards reframing party goals
in ways that were tolerable for the opposition.23 Indeed, the
main reason why the SAP was able to hold the government for
so long was its capacity to build coalitions.24 In this way, the
Penn History Review
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SAP developed a socialist paradigm that worked from within
capitalism and not against it. The importance of industrialists
and corporatists as collaborators in the consolidation of welfare
states is often overlooked because of the misconception that
these actors would be damaged by, and are therefore opposed
to, extensive social policy. However, influenced by the indirect
connection between the SAP and the SAF and mediated by
the LO, Swedish reformist policies were carefully shaped to
be in the interest of capitalists too. The government-led social
programs took pressure off employers to provide private social
benefits in order to attract scarce labor. Active labor mobility
and restructuring measures coupled with investment training
also suited the needs of profit-maximizing private enterprises.25
The SAP’s implementation of labor market reforms, family and
gender policies, and fiscal restructuring, discussed in turn in
the sections below, followed this framework and exemplified
the underlying logic of obtaining concomitant welfare for the
citizens and development for the nation by playing these two
facets of the economy against each other.
Labor Market Reforms
Due to a strong network of entrepreneurs and
industrialists that developed over the 19th and 20th centuries,
Sweden came out of the global economic crisis of the interwar
period unscathed. This network, mostly represented by the
powerful Wallenberg families that controlled important
technological companies and banks, was very proactive in
matters of industry modernization and restructuring, as well
as crisis response. Later, after World War II, the private sector
boomed. Consumer durable firms, including but not limited
to Electrolux, Luxor and Facit, expanded their production to
serve a growing international market. Heavier sectors performed
surprisingly well, too. For instance, Swedish shipbuilding
reached 10% of global production by the 1960s.26 The Marshall
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Plan was also a favorable factor to Swedish take-off.27
The economy overheated as it reached full employment
levels, triggering inflation. Policymakers were actually expecting
a post-war recession and were caught unprepared. The
expansionary policies that were prepared in anticipation of such
a recession only served to worsen the situation. The government
reacted by implementing a policy package including price
controls, trade regulations, and specific taxes, but with little
success at counteracting the expansion.28
Gösta Rhen and Rudolf Meidner, economists at the
LO, came up with an unconventional solution. At the 1951
LO Congress, they proposed the so-called Rhen-Meidner
Model (R-M Model). The two economists were critical of the
conventional Keynesian approach previously employed by the
SAP. They argued that Keynesianism is extremely inflationary
in a tight labor market. Supposedly, in such a setting, wages
tend to drift in a self-enforcing manner as groups of workers
demand higher wages in response to other workers obtaining
higher payouts as a result of competitive pressures. This is
bad for the economy because it causes inflation, but it is also
perceived as harmful for the cohesion of the labor movement.29
In contrast, the R-M Model is shaped around 4 main goals:
low inflation, full employment, high growth, and income
equality. The achievement of these goals is based on three main
policies: predominant tight fiscal policy over the business cycle,
solidaristic wages and active labor market mediation. Thus,
the R-M Model is both a macroeconomic theory of wages and
employment and a policy action program.30
The solidaristic wage policy, or “equal pay for
equal work,” means that wages are uniformly set across
industry sectors instead of being left to fluctuate along with
unpredictable market conditions. Wages are negotiated among
labor unions and employers’ organizations within each industry
so that wage differentials are decreased. For workers, the benefits
lie in the more equitable income distribution. For capitalists,
Penn History Review
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it is a decrease in competition for labor. For the socialist
government, it was an easy fix to the spiraling inflation.31
There are side-effects to the solidaristic wage plan, but
these are perceived as being features of the model. Inefficient
businesses that rely on underpaid workers to function are likely
to fail should they be forced to pay the industry-wide wage.
This leads to continuous restructuring and economic migration,
à la Schumpeterian creative destruction, with fresh labor supply
for the more resilient and efficient enterprises that survive.
Here is where the active labor market mediation part of the
R-M model comes into play. The government should step in
to aid with the transition of workers through various welfare
and training schemes. In the long-term, the hopes are that the
economy becomes stronger and more efficient, with the right
workers in the right places and the closure of insufficiently
productive enterprises.32
The R-M Model quickly became influential on the
SAP’s actions. To reinforce the solidaristic wage policy, the LO’s
position as a negotiator in relation to the SAF was strengthened.
The government also consolidated the Public Employment
Service (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, AMS), so that it could recruit
its staff directly from among trade union representatives
with real life knowledge of the labor market’s particularities.
The initiatives proved effective in taming the economy while
sustaining high rates of employment and equalizing earnings.
This, in turn, lessened the need for the redistributive welfare
state. Last but not least, the quality of jobs improved, and
Swedish workers were brought closer to middle class status.33 34
The labor market movements that took place in
Sweden in the post-war period show that welfare and economic
development are closely and bidirectionally connected through
a relationship that needs to be carefully managed. The favorable
global business cycle at the beginning of this period empowered
unions and prompted the government to intervene in labor
force allocation. In this way, workers’ welfare was improved
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through a more equitable income distribution and smooth
transitions among jobs. In turn, productivity increased and the
economy became stronger. However, this market dynamic was
heavily dependent upon the close collaboration and sustained
efforts of many actors -- SAP, LO, AMS, and employers -- to
reduce labor market frictions as much as possible.
Family and Gender Policies
Gustav Möller, minister of social services in 1924-1926
and 1932-1951, is conventionally seen as being the founding
father of the social democratic welfare state. Coming from a
humble, working-class background, Möller held radical views
of what a social democratic society should look like, while also
arguing for a gradual implementation. He strongly believed in
a universal support system that did not stigmatize the recipient.
He hoped to achieve this through reduced means testing
and an administration modeled after the AMS, with “street
bureaucrats” as staff. Most of all, he hoped for a welfare system
that could confer autonomy to mothers and their children.
Möller’s influence was key in minimizing means testing and
centralization in the Swedish welfare state.35
Other similarly influential voices in the SAP were Alva
and Gunnar Myrdal. In 1934, the two sociologists published
Crisis in the Population Question, drawing attention to an
imminent demographic crisis in Sweden caused by drastically
low childbirth rates. The couple argued that the traditional
family had become dysfunctional and the state should intervene
to regulate the consumption decisions of families. Furthermore,
children should be taken away from their families and raised
by society. They believed this would result in a reinforced sense
of social integration for the children and a liberation of parents
(especially mothers) from the constraints of family life.36
Needless to say, the Myrdals’ views were too radical for
the Swedish social democracy, but their rhetoric did manage
Penn History Review
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to construct a pronatalist agenda for the SAP, in favor of high
birth rates.37 Throughout the 1930s, family policy turned
into population policy. The government forbade the firing of
pregnant women, while also implementing programs such as
housing loans for young married couples and paid maternity
leave. Another remarkably simple but very effective policy
launched at this time was the disbursement of maternal aid,
maternal insurance, and children allowances directly to mothers
instead of their husbands, a considerable structural alteration
of conventional gender roles. The apogee of progressivity was
reached in 1972 when governmental reports started replacing
the term “maternal allowance” with “parental insurance.” For
the first time in Swedish public life, the responsibility for child
rearing was perceived as shared among the parents.38 39

Swedish sociologists Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, authors of Crisis in the Population Questions
and Nobel Prize laureates for Peace and Economics, respectively

In post-war Sweden, measures for assisting mothers
were slow to be implemented because they were seen as
damaging by both traditionalists and progressivists. The former
worried about undermining the paternal role and harming the
family structure. The latter was concerned that motherhoodbased rights might consolidate the gender divide, instead of
alleviating it. In practice, despite all the progress made, women
continued to live under an implicit “housewife contract”
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throughout the SAP’s period of political hegemony.40 Within
the party, Olivia Nordgren made efforts to legitimize “the
housewife profession,” enforcing traditional roles and opposing
gender equality.41 Despite these efforts, female participation in
the workforce increased, especially in part-time jobs.42 Although
the solidaristic wage policy rendered a gender-based wage gap
structurally impossible in its conventional sense, a distributional
gap persisted, with most women working in the public sector
rather than the private sector.43
It might be useful to consider how the Swedish model’s
approach to gender compares to other European states.
According to historian Susan Pedersen, the British welfare
state, with modest allowances for children and mothers, was
shaped by influential labor unions that wanted to preserve the
“breadwinner” status of the male worker. On the other hand,
France developed more robust family allowances in order
to avert unionizing pressures and to promote a pronatalist
agenda.44
With the examples of British and French welfare as
frames of reference, Sweden’s ability to develop a “middle way”
stands out once again. The Swedish case combined the French
pronatalist element with British-style acceptance of gender
imbalances and strong labor unionization. The former aspect
explains the extensive family policies, while the latter might hint
towards an answer for the observed distributional gender gap
between public and private workforce. Labor unions tended to
favor a conservative patriarchal structure. The private sector was
more heavily unionized, resulting in women having a harder
time joining it.
All in all, the Myrdals’ near-apocalyptic views of
a degenerating and vanishing Swedish society failed to
materialize. In fact, in the post-war period, marriage rates
reached record levels and birth rates recovered. It remains
unclear whether these changes can be attributed to the SAP’s
policies alone or were a natural outcome of strong economic
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growth.45 In any case, the temporal coincidence of increased
natality, reinforced welfare state, and consistent economic
growth in the 1940-1970 period are indicative of an underlying
mechanism linking development and welfare. In the Swedish
case, the outcomes of post-war family and gender policies
further support the view that welfare and development reinforce
each other through a delicate, bidirectional relationship.
Debates on Swedish demographic trends prompted government
actions that rebalanced gender roles and improved the welfare
and autonomy of women and children. These generous
measures were made possible by a burgeoning economy.
At the same time, the markets benefited from the increased
workforce participation of women and population increase that
ensued. However, these trends were threatened by social and
cultural attitudes resistant to the economic emancipation of
women, especially in the private sector. To maintain a steady
pace of progress, the government had to reconcile the implicit
“housewife contract” with economic motives.
The Crumbling of the Swedish Fiscal State
As discussed before, the intentions of the welfare state
were to elevate the Swedish worker to full citizenship status. In
the process, a large middle class was created. The middle class
that emerged in the 1950s came with its own unionization
structures, as well as private pension plans that disrupted social
cohesion. The flat-rate state pension that all workers benefited
from failed to satisfy middle class desires. Therefore, in 1959, in
order to accommodate its evolving electorate, the SAP passed
the controversial earnings-related ATP pension scheme.46
Esping-Andersen considers the implementation of the
ATP scheme a “watershed” moment in the SAP’s existence, as
the party started to shift focus from the working class to the
middle class. The foundational universalist principle gained
new meaning as the SAP’s policymakers abandoned egalitarian
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aspirations and instead chose to preserve moderate levels of
inequality. Attempting to remodel the welfare state for the
wants of the middle class was costly for the government,
requiring considerable increases in tax rates. Therefore, this was
also the moment when the tax system started to degenerate.47
The 1970s brought oil price shocks, stagflation, and
slow global growth.48 It also started to look like the R-M model
was backfiring. The negotiated solidaristic wages stagnated
rather than adjusting with the development of the economy.
This meant that, in some industries, businesses were pocketing
the entirety of the value of increased worker productivity. In
1975, the LO and Meidner came up with a drastic solution
for the democratization of capital. The Wage-Earners’ Funds
proposal involved seizing profits, establishing funds under
employees’ names, and thereby allowing employees ownership
of the enterprises they worked for. Needless to say, such a
revolutionary initiative was unpopular and negatively impacted
the labor movement’s image.49
Right before the 1976 elections, the popular Swedish
writer Astrid Lindgren published a pamphlet titled Pomperipossa
in the World of Money lamenting the 102% marginal tax rate
that she faced and criticizing the tax system. Her views were
representative of popular dissatisfaction with increasingly
convoluted taxation schemes. The media scandal that followed
barred the SAP from winning the elections again. After 44
years of rule, the SAP’s hegemonic social democratic regime
in Sweden came to an end.50 More than anything else, the
state of the fiscal system towards the end of this period shows
how sensitive the welfare-development relationship is to
inappropriate policymaking. As soon as the SAP abandoned
its commitment to near-equality and universalist policies in an
attempt to appease the emerging middle class, welfare ceased
supporting economic development and the party’s actions
backfired.
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Conclusion
Almost four decades after the release of his first
bestseller, Marquis Childs returned to Sweden to investigate the
outcomes of social democracy. Subsequently, in 1980, Childs
published Sweden: The Middle Way on Trial, raising doubts
about the state of the Nordic model and its future trajectory. It
looked like the Swedish welfare state had reached a crisis point
with unclear prospects.51
Ultimately, the Swedish case study indicates that welfare
and development are interlinked in a mutually reinforcing
manner. It has been repeatedly observed that social and labor
policies meant to increase public welfare directly supported
the economy by reducing labor market frictions, improving
workers’ productivity, and boosting domestic consumption.
At the same time, a performant economy was essentially a
necessity for the government to implement its welfare policies.
One might even be justified in wondering whether welfare and
development are not actually one and the same thing, or at least
two sides of the same coin.
This study has also shown that the welfare-development
reinforcement system is quite fragile, especially in the Swedish
case. Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme used to employ the
metaphor of a snail to describe the slow and steady pace of
social democratic reformism.52 When a certain threshold of
well-being and near-equality was achieved, the welfare state
lost its natural rhythm and the capacity to address further
demands from those it had assisted. What ensued was more of
a political failure than an economic one. Policymaking that was
excessively accommodative of myopic demands and inconsistent
with societal long-term goals tended to stretch the welfare
state beyond the room available in the welfare-development
relationship. Perhaps next time a nation attempts social
democracy, moderation should be prioritized more highly. Until
then, one of the biggest questions that remains to be answered
52
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in the Swedish case is the title of a 1955 Economist article about
Sweden: “What follows equality?”53

Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, who held office from 1969 until 1976
and then again from 1982 until his assassination in 1986
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